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ELECTION EVIDENCE: THE PROMISES AND REALITIES
OF CALIFORNIA’S CITIZENS COMMISSION
Brett Piersma*
[W]henever the people shall choose their representatives upon just
and undeniably equal measures, . . . it cannot be doubted to be the will
and act of the society . . . .
—John Locke1
The character of our democracy is at stake in how we elect our repre-
sentatives as much as in which representatives we elect and what laws
they enact.
—Dennis Thompson2
INTRODUCTION
That California political and electoral pathologies are some of the worst in the
nation has become axiomatic. The state is known for its crisis in governance,3 a notori-
ously tardy budget,4 and bizarre congressional districts.5 This reputation, indeed much
of California history, is a double-edged sword. Along with these pathologies and
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2014; M.Ed., University of California,
Santa Barbara, 2001; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2000. I would like to
thank Lee Tankle for his sufferance throughout this process, Rebecca Green for her comments
on an early draft, and the editorial staff for their improvements to the final product. All mis-
takes, of course, are my own. I would also like to thank Janel, Ella, and Lucie for making it
all worthwhile.
1 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 175 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
2 DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES, at vii (2002).
3 Raphael J. Sonenshein, Can a Citizens’ Commission Help Repair California Government?
Lessons from Local Charter Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 637, 657–58 (2011) (describing the
belief that California has major structural problems as “widespread”).
4 See Karl Manheim et al., Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions and Government
Reform: Symposium Introduction, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 393, 400–01 (2011) (assigning blame
for California’s dysfunction in part to citizens’ overuse of the initiative, referendum, and recall
processes); Joe Mathews, Op-Ed., The California Fix: Making Amends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2009, at A17 (quoting California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald George: “Frequent amend-
ments—coupled with the implicit threat of more in the future—have rendered our state govern-
ment dysfunctional.”); The Ungovernable State, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 33 (describing
California’s budget dysfunction and attributing it to a “combination of features” of the state’s
political and structural dynamics).
5 Patrick McGreevy, Redistricting Panel Will Draw a Line, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, at
AA1 (describing the 23rd district as the “ribbon of shame” because it narrows to a small strip of
land that stretches 200 miles along the California coast “disappear[ing] at high tide”).
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systemic breakdowns come success stories in reform.6 In a nation of states as incubators
for policy experimentation, California is a teeming Petri dish.7 The state has developed
a reputation for setting national trends in social8 and political reform, often decades be-
fore other states.9 For example, California is one of only twenty-two states to adopt the
initiative,10 referendum,11 or both during the Progressive Era of the early twentieth cen-
tury.12 Of these states, California is one of only ten to adopt the initiative for both stat-
utes and state constitutional amendments.13 While more than a third of the states have
provisions allowing citizens to recall elected officials,14 the procedure had only been
used once in the United States to recall a governor before the recall of California
Governor Gray Davis in 2003.15 Yet California is not just experimental and progressive.
Steeped in populism, its measures consistently undermine the political power of elected
representatives by turning power back to voters “making public policy at the ballot
box.”16 It is no surprise then that California’s most recent effort to reform the process
of redistricting is also among the most progressive and antipolitician in the nation: the
adoption of an independent citizens redistricting commission.17
6 See STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING, PART I 141 (Lynda McNeil ed., 1982) (describ-
ing California’s progressive political and electoral history, particularly its roots back to Upton
Sinclair and the impact of immigration).
7 Justice Louis Brandeis’s dictum in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann is perhaps
the best-known expression of this concept: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel so-
cial and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
While it has since become common wisdom among political scientists, its constitutional home
is the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the United States to the states
or to the people. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8 See, e.g., JONATHAN BELL, CALIFORNIA CRUCIBLE: THE FORGING OF MODERN AMERICAN
LIBERALISM 3 (2012) (“California had by the 1970s become a trailblazer for national debates
over taxation, sexual and gender rights, racial discrimination, and the welfare state . . . .”).
9 See STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING, supra note 6, at 141.
10 Initiative is “a petition process that allows voters to place one or more propositions on the
referendum ballot” and has roots in “the Athenian ecclesia of the fifth century B.C.” JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING 1 (1999).
11 Referendum is “the submission of laws, whether in the form of statute or constitution, to
the voting citizens for their ratification or rejection,” and has been employed in the United States
in some form since the Revolution. ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN
AMERICA 2 (Guant, Inc. 1997) (1893).
12 Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. Of S. Cal., State I&R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org
/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
13 Id.
14 MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
CALIFORNIA’S RECALL AND BEYOND 11 (2008).
15 Id. at 4–5, 11 (describing the removal of North Dakota Governor Lynn Frazier in 1921).
Recall has been used throughout the states to recall other state and local officials. See id. at 11.
16 Id. at vii.
17 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808,
1812 (2012) (describing both Arizona and California’s redistricting commissions as “the boldest
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The independent commission ostensibly depoliticizes the process of drawing state
senate, assembly, and congressional district lines by removing politicians almost en-
tirely from the process. While controversial, these commissions address the inherent
conflict of interest of partisan gerrymandering. Yet advocates have also touted the citi-
zens commission’s potential to increase district competitiveness, reduce partisanship in
government, and create more centrist legislatures.18 If true, commissions may untie the
Gordian Knot of dysfunctional government and reduce much of the gridlock plaguing
California government.19
This Note’s main finding is that these possibilities are overstated, especially in view
of the results of the 2012 election in California. Even if greater competitiveness is desir-
able and offers these potential outcomes, the constraints on legislative redistricting also
constrain citizens commissions. These constraints stem from federal statutes, court deci-
sions, and state guiding principles. As a result, redistricting commissions cannot create
as many truly competitive districts as hoped and offer little of the promises made by
their proponents. On the other hand, the California citizens commission did achieve its
most obvious and primary goal: to remove self-interested legislators from the process
and make it “open so it cannot be controlled by the party in power.”20
This Note concludes that the primary impact of the citizens commission’s work in
California has been to increase the appearance that the system is less beholden to politi-
cians and to weaken the power of legislators to use redistricting in political horse trad-
ing. The new maps also forced several legislators to retire rather than face opponents
they could not defeat or more popular fellow party members.21
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I outlines the constraints that Congress, the
Supreme Court, and state legislatures place on redistricting. Part II discusses the dem-
ocratic impetus for redistricting reform and evaluates the merits of citizens commis-
sions against other redistricting mechanisms. It also briefly outlines the history of
redistricting in California. Part III discusses the passage of Propositions 11 and 20 and
assesses the legal challenges to both. Part IV embarks on case studies of three
California districts and examines the impact of the commission’s work on the 2012
congressional elections.
departures from the traditional legislative redistricting model”). Part II describes other, less pro-
gressive options available to reformers such as advisory commissions or commissions which
ratify district lines drawn by legislatures.
18 See infra Part II.
19 The text of California Proposition 11 did not purport to increase competitiveness. It did,
however, identify the “serious conflict of interest” involved in having legislators draw their own
districts and explained that this is “why 99 percent of incumbent politicians were reelected.” Text
of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11 § 2(a) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov
/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf. Instead, increased competitiveness and decreased polarization
were held out by major proponents as benefits of the proposition. See infra Part III.
20 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11 § 2(c) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthe
lines.ca.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf.
21 See infra Part IV.
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I. CONSTRAINTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
A democracy may be measured by the vibrancy of its elections.22 Only when candi-
dates actively compete for their seats in contested elections can voters hold politicians
accountable for their decisions.23 Indeed, the “competitive struggle for the people’s
vote” is a necessary condition to the democratic process.24 For an election to be vibrant
and competitive, the votes cast must have real meaning and must not count as a mere
rubber stamp on decisions made beyond their reach.25 Yet Congress has become the
least competitive of all representative institutions in recent years, largely due to the re-
districting process practiced in most states.26 As the process is currently conducted in
most states, redistricting presents at least two concerns central to the democratic process
and to this Note’s thesis.
First is the concern about who will control the redistricting process. When repre-
sentatives redraw their own district lines, they have a clear “personal interest distinct
from that of their Constituents,” as James Madison warned at the Constitutional
Convention.27 The American system of state-designed redistricting is particularly vul-
nerable to this problem of self interest as legislators control the process by which their
constituents are carved out.28 This often results in “gerrymanders”—oddly shaped dis-
tricts legislators draw to “pack,” “stack,” or “crack” voters in pursuit of legislators’ elec-
toral goals.29 Incumbents of opposite parties often collude in bipartisan gerrymanders
22 JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES AND
LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 2 (2008).
23 THOMAS E. MANN & BRUCE E. CAIN, PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 1 (2005).
24 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1950) (“[T]he
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote.”).
25 WINBURN, supra note 22, at 3 (stating that voters vote not only so their candidate will win,
but so that their vote will “count,” suggesting an almost ethereal aspect to the process).
26 MANN & CAIN, supra note 23, at 1.
27 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 249–50 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1937).
28 WINBURN, supra note 22, at 3.
29 See, e.g., Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue Golden State: Why California’s
Proposition 11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 311, 314
(2011) (“[S]tacking refers to combining concentrations of a minority population with larger con-
centrations of a white population to ensure that the districts contain white voting majorities.”);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1379, 1416 (2012) (discussing the “pack” and “stack” concepts in the context of limiting minor-
ity groups’ representation by cramming them into one single district or dividing them so thinly
so as to deny representation altogether). For a visual example of how this technique functions,
see Mike Sayer, Southern Coalition for Social Justice: Training on Political Redistricting,
(July 26–31, 2010), http://latinojustice.org/redistricting/ny/Voting_Dilution_Techniques_Mike
_Sayer.pdf.
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to secure reelection of each party’s incumbents, resulting in non-competitive maps.30
Thus, while incumbents are interested in securing reelection with as little competition
as possible, their constituents desire the exact opposite: vibrant elections in which can-
didates propose distinct and substantive solutions to complex problems in a competitive
fight where voters suss out the best ideas and select their candidates accordingly. When
representatives control redistricting and have the chance to “select voters” rather than
vice versa, something fundamental to democracy is sacrificed.31
A second concern is that the process of redistricting will result in unequal represen-
tation, whereby “one person’s vote counts only a fraction . . . of another’s” vote.32
While the Constitution does not mandate a particular redistricting process or even that
representatives be selected by districts rather than at large,33 Congress, the Supreme
Court, and state legislatures have imposed many constraints on the process.34 Many of
these constraints are related to racial gerrymandering and voter dilution.35
If redistricting as legislatures currently practice it results in noncompetitive districts,
which themselves result in a host of governance-related pathologies, redistricting reform
may be the most promising path toward improving how government functions.36 The
U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on gerrymandering, paying particular attention to
race and majority-minority districts,37 while addressing the issue of the political gerry-
mander differently.38 All of these rules represent constraints that bind legislatures and
will also bind any group tasked with redrawing district lines.
A. Gerrymandering and Constraints on Redistricting
The Court has been more lucid in setting forth a standard with regard to race than
to political line drawing. The Court has held that efforts to separate districts solely on
30 Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform since Baker
v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
6, 23 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
31 SCHUMPETER, supra note 24; see infra Part I.B.
32 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 120 (1980).
33 See THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 51 (2008) (explaining that the Constitution does not mandate
the use of single-member districts and “many states did elect representatives from at-large, multi-
member districts for many years”). This changed with the Apportionment Act of 1842. Id.
34 See infra Part I.A.
35 See infra Part I.A.
36 Cain et al., supra note 30, at 17 (explaining why redistricting reform at the state level has
emerged as a way to increase competitive elections).
37 The history of voting rights legislation and jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note
except insofar as they mandate redistricting processes as discussed below.
38 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1382–84 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence on political gerrymandering as leaving unresolved whether “a standard for identifying
unlawful gerrymanders might exist”).
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the basis of race can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.39 The Court has
struck down racial gerrymanders in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, citing race as
the legislatures’ improper “predominant purpose.”40 In effect the Court has said that
states may use race as a factor, but it may not be the factor.41 Further, under the Voting
Rights Act’s (VRA) “preclearance” provision, specified states and counties must get
federal approval prior to changing their voting practices.42 The Court thus views race
as a suspect classification. As a result, states will face strict scrutiny when they draw
majority-minority districts using race, requiring the state to show the plan is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.43
This creates an uneasy tension. Under the VRA, the Justice Department may man-
date states to draw majority-minority districts, but those districts could be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause.44 Further, because states will necessarily rely on race
in order to draw such districts, it will be easier for challengers to prove that the states
utilized race as the dominant factor.45 State legislators and redistricting commissions
must trace a careful path when redistricting voters from one district to another.
Those redrawing district lines are also not permitted to “weight the vote of one
county or one district more heavily than . . . another.”46 The Court has applied this “one
person, one vote” standard to elections to both the U.S. House of Representatives and
state legislatures.47 These reapportionment cases have had a dramatic effect on the
39 See Mark E. Rush, Representation in Theory and Practice, in VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 7 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
40 Daniel H. Lowenstein, Race and Representation in the Supreme Court, in VOTING RIGHTS
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 69–74 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998) (summarizing
the racial gerrymandering cases as “mov[ing] sharply away from the Court’s tradition . . . of re-
specting the fundamentally political nature of redistricting”).
41 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
42 Preclearance is mandated in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Pamela S. Karlan, The
Impact of the Voting Rights Act on African Americans: Second- and Third-Generation Issues,
in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (Mark E. Rush, ed. 1998).
43 CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN AMERICA
66 (2010).
44 Rush, supra note 39, at 7.
45 BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 66.
46 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244 (1962). Until Baker, the Court held questions of distribu-
tion of citizens to be a political question—a constitutional issue that courts should abstain from
resolving because they are better left to the other departments of government. The Court an-
nounced the “one person, one vote” standard in Gray v. Sanders. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). See
Jesse H. Choper, Introduction to THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007); Richard L.
Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfulfilled, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah &
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 1962 Baker v. Carr decision was
“the beginning of the end of the political question doctrine”).
47 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (ruling unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause legislative plans for the apportionment of seats in the Alabama legislature);
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process of redistricting, yet have also caused significant controversy. A case can be
made that the voter dilution cases themselves led to the race-conscious districting plans
the Court was preoccupied with under the VRA in the 1990s.48 The reapportionment
cases laid the foundation for the transformation of the right to vote, an individual right,
into the right to effective representation, an “interest-based or group right.”49 This has
introduced a conflict into equal protection law between individual and group rights.
Justice Clarence Thomas lamented this irreconcilable conflict in Holder v. Hall,50
“reject[ing] the assumption . . . [that] the Voting Rights Act can be construed to cover
potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms.”51 Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress
has provided clear guidance on how states might implement the VRA’s mandate to
remedy situations of vote dilution and abide by the ruling that race is a suspect classi-
fication, subject to strict scrutiny.52 A citizens commission entering the redistricting
farrago may find it nearly impossible to satisfy every rule, regulation, and restriction
while making any significant improvement to competitiveness.
B. Political Gerrymandering
Despite Madison’s fear of politicians controlling the process, partisan gerryman-
dering—drawing district lines to protect incumbents or target opponents—has re-
ceived the Court’s imprimatur and is not unconstitutional.53 In Bush v. Vera,54 Justice
O’Connor explained: “[W]e have recognized incumbency protection, at least in the
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (ruling that apportionment of congressional district seats
in Georgia so that one congressman represented two to three times as many as another violated
the Constitution).
48 Anthony A. Peacock, Equal Representation or Guardian Democracy? The Supreme
Court’s Foray into the Politics of Reapportionment and Its Legacy, in VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 23, 43 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
49 Id.
50 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
51 Id. at 945.
52 Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, Voting Rights Mismatch: The Challenge of Applying
the Voting Rights Act to “Other Minorities,” in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE
UNITED STATES 141, 142 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
53 Unless, of course, unlawfully based on race. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(finding that a North Carolina redistricting map raised a sufficient question of racial gerrymander-
ing to suggest an equal protection violation); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (ruling that three Texas districts were unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered). But see
James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott’s Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of
Slavery, S. CHANGES, Fall 1998, at 28, reprinted in 3 RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE
CONSTITUTION 336 (Marsha J. Tyson Darling ed., 2001) (characterizing Shaw and its progeny
as promoting an unworkable color-blind paradigm); Jamin B. Raskin, Supreme Court’s Double
Standard, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at 167–68 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s rulings as a
double standard meant to protect “white incumbents” in the U.S. House of Representatives but
not African-American or Latino majorities).
54 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbent[s],’ as a legitimate state goal.”55
In Davis v. Bandemer,56 the Court seemed to narrow this by recognizing a cause of
action for political gerrymandering, but found the Indiana map in question did not
surmount the “threshold requirement” for showing “discriminatory vote dilution.”57
The standard the plurality announced—that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs
only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade
a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”—
proved unworkable.58
The Court did no better in Vieth v. Jubelirer,59 where it refused to overturn a
Pennsylvania plan challenged by Democratic voters.60 Facing the opportunity to give
teeth to the Bandemer standard, the Court instead summarily ruled the issue of partisan
gerrymandering “non-justiciable” because “no judicially discernible and manageable
standards for adjudicating such claims exist.”61 A set of four justices stated that plain-
tiffs had proved sufficient evidence to win, but relied on different standards to come to
their conclusion.62 Plaintiffs in every case since Bandemer have faced similar outcomes
as the Court has refused to find sufficient disadvantage to warrant overturning a state’s
partisan redistricting.63
While the Court has severely circumscribed the potential for future political gerry-
manders to be ruled unconstitutional, California has enunciated a clear rule on political
gerrymanders: “Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discrimi-
nating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.”64 So reads the
California Constitution since voters approved Proposition 11 in 2008, exemplifying
the “laboratories of democracy” vision of American federalism.65 More importantly,
this simple clause frees up the citizens commission to pursue other goals such as com-
petitiveness rather than incumbency protection.66
The Supreme Court has required that the districts be adjusted every ten years after
the census and that such districts be as nearly equal as possible.67 Apart from concerns
55 Id. at 964.
56 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
57 Id. at 110.
58 Id.; see Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1381–82 (arguing that in the area of political
gerrymandering, “the case law is in chaos . . . [and] [t]here is thus an urgent doctrinal and aca-
demic need for new ideas”).
59 541 U.S. 267 (2003).
60 Id. at 267.
61 Id.
62 BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 130.
63 Id.
64 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
65 California Online Voting Guide: Proposition 11, CAL. VOTER FOUND., http://www
.calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/general/props/prop11.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2008).
66 See infra Part I.C.
67 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (“The conception of political equality . . . can
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
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about racial gerrymandering and the weight of each vote, the Court has left the matter
to the states. As a result, most states allow legislatures to either directly draw electoral
maps or play an integral role in the process.68 This very discretion at the state level has
made possible a variety of proposals to change the process, each bearing the marks of
the state’s unique history, culture, and experience with corruption.
C. Principles and Competitiveness
Any group tasked with redrawing district lines, be it the legislature or an inde-
pendent commission, will be constrained not only by federal law and court-imposed
restrictions, which themselves vary by location, but also by traditional redistricting prin-
ciples.69 For example, in California, only four counties are subject to the Section 5 pre-
clearance procedures of the Federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) while all of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Virginia are.70 All states, however, must abide by Section 2 of the Act
which prohibits any practice that denies or abridges anyone’s right to vote based on
race, color, or minority language status.71 But many states have gone beyond federal
law by writing into their constitutions several “principles” to guide redistricting.72
Geographic contiguity, where all parts of a district are connected to each other,
is “one of the most common rules for drawing district lines”73 and is specifically enu-
merated in the California Constitution.74 Compactness, when a district has a “regular
shape, with constituents all living relatively near to each other” is also a “traditional”
principle75 and, according to the California Constitution, should be followed “[t]o the
extent practicable.”76 The geographical integrity of political subdivisions such as cities,
counties, and communities of interest must also be “respected in a manner that mini-
mizes their division to the extent possible.”77
Noticeably absent from this list is “competitiveness,” which is not specifically enu-
merated in the California Constitution and has not been identified as a “traditional
(1963))). The California Constitution also requires districts in that state to be reasonably equal
in population. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
68 Corbett A. Grainger, Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California?,
53 J.L. & ECON. 545, 545–46 (2010).
69 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly required them to, many states apply the fol-
lowing redistricting principles: compactness, geographic contiguity, retaining political subdivi-
sions, and maintaining communities of interest. See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010
Census, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 244–45 (2009).
70 See infra Part III.A.
71 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
72 JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 50 (2010).
73 Id.
74 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
75 LEVITT, supra note 72, at 51.
76 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
77 Id.
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race-neutral districting principle[ ]” by the Supreme Court.78 But increased competitive-
ness has been cited as a benefit concomitant with the creation of citizens redistricting
commissions.79 Should citizens commissions intentionally attempt to draw more com-
petitive districts? If so, to what extent can they succeed when they are otherwise con-
strained by so many other rules, regulations, and principles?
II. THE IMPULSE TO REFORM REDISTRICTING
Before evaluating Propositions 11 and 20 in California, the work of its redistricting
commission, or the outcome of the 2012 election, it is important to discuss the constitu-
tional and democratic implications of such efforts. This Part discusses legislative redis-
tricting and asks why citizens redistricting commissions emerge and whether they offer
substantial hope to ameliorate the ills of traditional redistricting processes.
A. Redistricting by Legislature
Under the U.S. Constitution, the method of drawing electoral maps is left to the
discretion of the states.80 Yet from the nation’s inception, the dangers of allowing poli-
ticians to choose their own voters has been apparent.81 Elbridge Gerry’s original
“Gerry-mander” snaked through Massachusetts and ensured the election of a fellow
Republican.82 Since then, the term has been a synonym for opportunism of the party in
power.83 Evidence shows a long history of political manipulation of district lines at the
state level. Nearly every decadal redistricting from 1789 to 1913 contained at least
one district where contiguity was questionable.84 Recent evidence suggests that even
78 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995) (including such principles as “compact-
ness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared in-
terests, [and] racial considerations”).
79 See infra Part II.C.
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections . . . shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.”); Tim Storey, An Overview of Redistricting,
in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 1, 1–2 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
81 See Peter F. Galderisi & Bruce Cain, Introduction: Redistricting Past, Present, and Future,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (explaining that the
practice of gerrymandering actually preceded Governor Elbridge Gerry’s famous 1812 plan “as
the shifting of district boundaries for political advantage occurred with some regularity in states
and in the British colonies”).
82 BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 107.
83 See Storey, supra note 80, at 2.
84 Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI.
HIST. 159, 179 (1998). A “contiguous district” is “one in which it is possible to travel from any
point in the district to any other point in the district without crossing the district boundary . . . .”
Justin Levitt, Redistricting in the West: The Legal Context, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 15, 24 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011). Today, many states require
legislative districts to be contiguous. Id.
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after the reforms of the 1960s, modern districts are more often discontiguous than they
historically were.85
Until the twentieth century, the basic unit of representation at the state level was the
town or county,86 and the evidence shows state legislatures did not often divide counties
or towns in their redistricting.87 However, as the population grew into the early twen-
tieth century, the apportioning of seats did not keep pace with population shifts, both
intentionally and by neglect.88 Just prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark population
and redistricting rulings in the 1960s, one Southern California district had 422 times as
many people as the smallest district, and Tennessee had failed to reapportion repre-
sentatives for sixty years.89
Legislative redistricting therefore presents a host of dangers. As previously dis-
cussed, conflicts of interest are inherent in the process. Representatives may protect
their own and their party’s electoral prospects while seeking to dilute the votes of the
minority party.90 Without external pressure, either from citizens groups, federal law, or
state law, legislators write electoral rules with substantial discretion, inclined to protect
partisan gains and scuttle electoral reform proposals.91 With the power to change the
process of redrawing district lines vested in the very body that benefits from the status
quo, it is not surprising that this system persists. While some states have adopted
some form of citizens commission, most states continue to allow redistricting by the
state legislature.92
B. Redistricting Reform as Remonstration
Redistricting reform has become the siren song to the politically dispossessed, of-
fering perhaps the last best hope to restore democratic representation and responsive
government to statehouses.93 The hope attached to redistricting reform in California par-
allels the enthusiasm that surrounded the passage of the initiative and referendum in
1911 when Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson touted the promises of extending the
initiative to the people as “perhaps the greatest service that could be rendered our
85 Altman, supra note 84, at 180.
86 Levitt, supra note 84, at 15.
87 Altman, supra note 84, at 180.
88 Levitt, supra note 84, at 15–16.
89 Id. at 16.
90 Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Redistricting, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 111 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
91 Id. at 112.
92 Levitt, supra note 84, at 17.
93 For a brief summary explaining why the former redistricting process resulted in more ideo-
logical representatives in the California legislature, an increase in registered-independent voters,
and greater polarization, see George Skelton, A Polarized, Paralyzed State, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2009, at A2.
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State,” bringing an end to “exaction and extortion from the people.”94 The irony that
many of the pathologies facing California today may be unintended consequences
of the initiative system itself cannot be lost on present day reformers.95 The greater
irony is using the initiative process to fix a state arguably made ungovernable by that
very process.96
When voters in states with the initiative process become convinced the political
system is broken beyond what legislators can manage to repair, they often turn to
changing the way legislators are selected.97 Research has shown that states with the ini-
tiative are far more likely to adopt reforms weakening party control over redistricting.98
For example, in 1974 Colorado voters, frustrated with legislators’ proposed district map
and the impact it would have on communities bifurcating them indiscriminately, passed
an initiative delegating district drawing to a commission.99 A similar campaign in
Oklahoma, which then-Governor Edmondson supported out of frustration with the
“rurally dominated legislature,” failed in 1960 after opposition developed within the
governor’s own party.100 The path to a commission in Arizona was fraught with legal
94 Hiram Johnson, Governor, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911), available at http://governors
.library.ca.gov/addresses/23-hjohnson01.html.
95 See Skelton, supra note 93 (identifying two “voter-injected poisons—term limits and the
two-thirds vote requirement” as a cause of legislative gridlock); Editorial, Prop. 25 Changes
Everything, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A24 (questioning the wisdom of California voters who
simultaneously passed Proposition 25, which removed the two-thirds vote requirement for adopt-
ing a budget, and Proposition 26, which created a two-thirds vote requirement for raising fees).
96 For more recent examples of how the initiative process has affected how Sacramento
operates, see George Skelton, Californians Split Their Vote, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A2
(characterizing the results of the 2010 election as “plac[ing] more shackles on the governor
and Legislature” and quoting governor-elect Jerry Brown as saying, “[t]he taxpayers gave and
they also took away”). Skelton also decries Californians’ rejection of Proposition 21 (which
would have “saved the state’s deteriorating parks”), passage of Proposition 22 (a “shackle on
Sacramento . . . [that] will cost the state billions by eliminating its ability to tap local trans-
portation and redevelopment funds”), and rejection of Proposition 24 (voters “defended big
business” by rejecting the repeal of corporate tax breaks). Id.
97 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 345 (2007) (compar-
ing factors contributing to redistricting initiatives such as “[a] recent egregious gerrymander or
a nationwide tide in favor of electoral reform . . .” with instances in which voters are “relatively
satisfied with the political status quo, [such that] they may be reluctant to try to fix what does not
seem to be broken.”); see also Cain, supra note 17, at 1813 (describing the “evolutionary pattern”
of the creation of these commissions in reaction to elected officials’ actions).
98 Donovan, supra note 90, at 130.
99 Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 355–56. Today, the Colorado General Assembly draws
district lines for congressional seats while the Reapportionment Commission draws State Senate
and State House of Representative district lines. See Redistricting in Colorado, COLORADO:
THE OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CGA-ReDistrict
/CBON/1251581558103#How_is_Redistricting_accomplished_in_Colorado_ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
100 Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 348. A slightly modified version passed just two years
later, although notably after the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr.
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hurdles for nearly thirty years.101 Voters finally passed Proposition 106 in 2000 granting
authority to redistrict to a five-person commission drawn from a pool of citizens re-
viewed by the state’s Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.102 This is just a
sampling of the push factors that result in citizens redistricting commissions.
There are many ways a state might approach redistricting, utilizing any combi-
nation of citizens, state bureaucrats, legislators, and judges. Bruce Cain, Professor of
Political Science at Stanford University, has evaluated these different combinations
using two key factors: independence and autonomy.103 Using these two as yardsticks
to measure the composition and the power of redistricting commissions will provide us
with a view of just where true authority over the redistricting process lies.104
First, independence means freedom from control by legislators.105 By measuring
the independence of those individuals drawing the lines, we can evaluate the degree to
which a commission has an implicit conflict of interest.106 Independence can be viewed
as lying on a spectrum between complete dependence and complete independence.107
Many systems, described more fully below, allow legislators themselves to draw the
lines and are arguably the least independent.108 Other systems allow legislators to be in-
volved in the selection of commission members, creating either a moderate degree of
independence in the case of designees or no independence when composed of elected
101 The state’s district plans were overturned by a district court in 1971, rejected by a federal
court in 1981, and rejected by the Justice Department for failing to produce enough “majority
minority” districts in the early 1990s. Cain, supra note 17, at 1831. In 2009, the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled on the commission’s 2002 plan, finding that Proposition 106 requires the
commission to create “more competitive districts to the extent practicable when doing so does
not cause significant detriment to the other goals.” Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 687 (Ariz. 2009).
102 Cain, supra note 17, at 1831–32.
103 Id. at 1818–19. Jonathan Winburn discusses largely the same two factors, which he labels,
respectively, “membership” and “capacity.” Jonathan Winburn, Does it Matter if Legislatures
or Commissions Draw the Lines?, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 137,
141 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
104 See Cain, supra note 17, at 1812 (summarizing independent redistricting commissions’
performance and offering observations regarding their independence and autonomy).
105 Id. at 1814. Cain instantiates “independence” by describing a commission of members who
cannot hold political office. Id. at 1818.
106 Id. at 1812; see also BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 133 (describing the Iowa approach as
highly revered because of the “limited influence of party politics” even though the plan does not
come from a commission).
107 Cain utilizes a “continuum” of independence and places New York’s “advisory com-
mission” only slightly apart from pure legislative districting because both elected officials
and nonlegislators serve on it. Cain, supra note 17, at 1814.
108 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 133 (discussing Madison’s warning about “the dangers of
letting representatives decide their own privileges”). Thompson argues that we should be
“concerned that [legislators] favor rules that protect incumbents and discourage challengers.” Id.
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officials.109 Finally, in some systems there is little or no nexus between the commis-
sioners and the legislators whose districts they are mapping.110
Second, autonomy means the ability to enact and place into effect the product of
the commission’s work.111 In some systems, a commission may be fully independent,
yet its work is merely advisory.112 This is the case in three states where the commission
serves only to advise either the legislature or the governor.113 Other systems are struc-
tured such that the commission’s work only takes effect if the legislature fails to adopt
a new map.114
This framework suggests several questions about redistricting. First, is it even pos-
sible within the American system to design any redistricting procedure, be it utilizing
elected, appointed, or randomly drawn individuals, that would be genuinely free from
self-interest? Is it inevitable that politics and partisanship will seep into the process?
Second, is placing the redistricting process in the hands of unelected citizens more or
less democratic than allowing elected representatives to do so? After all, removing
incumbents who have been duly elected by “jiggling the lines is, in a sense, undem-
ocratic.”115 Third, under what circumstances might a commission, operating dispas-
sionately and following specified rules of neutrality, nonetheless run afoul of equal
protection guarantees or create political gerrymanders? Finally, applying this frame-
work and these inquiries, how did California fare in its first foray into citizens drawing
district lines in the 2012 election?
C. Citizens Commissions
Of the arguments in favor of removing from state legislatures the task of redistrict-
ing and delegating it to a citizens commission, one has become particularly salient: to
reduce the “safety” of electoral districts116 thereby increasing competitiveness. Safe dis-
tricts, it is thought, result in less engaged, more partisan politicians and more polariza-
tion in legislatures.117 The argument may be broken down as follows.
109 Cain, supra note 17, at 1816.
110 Id. at 1817.
111 Id. at 1814 (describing “autonomous power” as the ability to “enact a redistricting plan
without legislative approval”).
112 WINBURN, supra note 22, at 141.
113 Id. at 141–42. Maine, Maryland, and Vermont utilize this system. Several other states have
implemented temporary advisory commissions. Id.
114 Id. at 141.
115 BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 69.
116 A “safe district” is defined as one in which an elected representative is all but certain
to win reelection, thus requiring little or no campaigning on the part of the representative. Some
political scientists consider a district safe when the candidate wins greater than fifty-five percent
of the vote. JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 327 (Charles
Hartford et al. eds., 10th ed. 2006).
117 Chavez, supra note 29, at 338 (outlining supporters’ arguments for competitive districts
including the proposition that they lead to greater responsiveness among legislators).
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First, citizens commissions operate under neutral or bipartisan impulses, consider-
ing population change and other nonpolitical principles, as opposed to partisan factors
such as incumbent protection.118 This is so because these commissions are specifically
designed to be independent with rigorous and thorough vetting processes to ensure the
members are not beholden to politicians.119 While there is reason to question this prem-
ise, this doubt may in fact reflect distrust in the design of the commission rather than
lack of faith in the commissioners.120
A second premise is that a commission operating under such neutral impulses will
create more competitive districts.121 This is thought to result naturally rather than by the
design of commissioners as they focus on nonpolitical goals.122 In fact, Proposition 11
does not require the commission to use competitiveness as a factor.123 This outcome,
increased competitiveness, is thought to result indirectly and naturally when citizens
commissions adhere to neutral criteria such as compactness, geographic and political
boundaries, and respect for communities.124
Finally, competitive districts force candidates to move closer to the political center
and to respond more attentively to constituents by attenuating their positions.125
118 See WINBURN, supra note 22, at 17 (explaining that district lines should be drawn based
on “factors that either apply to both parties (or incumbents) equally or, most likely, do not even
consider partisanship (or incumbent standing)”).
119 Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513,
533–36 (2011). Levitt describes the reason for these commissioners’ independence: “[C]itizens
whose job security is not affected by the outcome of a redistricting process will feel far less com-
pulsion to distort otherwise coherent districts . . . .” Id. at 538.
120 Id. at 540–41 (describing people’s tendencies to “default[ ] on difficult political judgments,
prioritizing certain criteria for the wrong reasons”).
121 Jean Merl & Michael J. Mishak, Panel’s Final Redistricting Maps Drawn, L.A. TIMES,
July 30, 2011, at A1. Other changes to the redistricting process may also result in more compet-
itive districts. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 29, at 369–70 (proposing a hybrid approach in which
“[t]he commission could review the plan developed by the Legislature and propose changes”).
122 This theory has been debated for decades among political scientists. Recently, in view of
California’s experiment with redistricting, it has gained more attention. See generally Chavez,
supra note 29. For a list of criteria for district boundaries the commission must follow, in order
of priority, see Redistricting Reform in California: Proposition 11 on the November 2008
California Ballot, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES 21 [hereinafter Redistricting Reform
in California], available at http://policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/95928.pdf.
123 Redistricting Reform in California, supra note 122, at 27 (summarizing two possible rea-
sons why the authors left competitiveness out: the Arizona experience where competitive districts
were challenged in the courts for seven years and the difficulty of creating competitive districts
in California due to population concentration and compactness requirements).
124 See Cain, supra note 17, at 1823 (explaining that creating more competitive districts was
an implicit motive of redistricting reform in California despite ballot measures lacking competi-
tion as explicitly enumerated criteria).
125 BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 113. The concomitant inference is that responsiveness to con-
stituents is an element of good democracy. But see BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 75–89 (2008)
(arguing that noncompetitive districts and districts with little ideological diversity, maximize the
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Politicians in competitive districts face a more centrist median voter, necessitating more
frequent interactions with voters to gauge public opinion.126 It would not be so easy to
assume the views of a politician’s constituency’s position.127 Furthermore, under the
California law, this moderating effect would be felt in Sacramento as well as in
Washington, D.C. because the process applies to both state district lines as well as
congressional ones.128
An incumbent who has typically won reelection in his district for several elections
who then faces a new, more evenly divided constituency due to redistricting, faces a
difficult set of options: retire, acknowledging that victory in this new district is more
than an uphill battle; hold to his political values and be prepared to lose with his head
held high; or adjust his positions toward the middle voters in the new district.129 Alter-
natively, he could elect to run in a nearby district with more like-minded voters and
face a difficult primary battle against a fellow partisan.130
Competitive districts are also thought to increase electoral participation131 and re-
duce party polarization in the legislature.132 The conclusion aptly drawn from these
premises is that any state interested in structural reforms to encourage moderate political
platforms and politicians who are more responsive to the electorate should consider im-
plementing the citizens commission model. If this is true, citizens commissions may
hold great potential to ameliorate gridlock in state capitals and in Congress.
While these goals may be desirable, independent citizens commissions do not come
easily or emerge overnight. They are the result of a long process of development subject
to historical forces and the political culture of a population.133 Some states confront
number of winning voters, improve voters’ attitudes toward Congress, and enhance represen-
tation by increasing the number of constituents accurately represented by their congressman).
126 As with many of the arguments surrounding citizens commissions, there is some debate
as to whether politicians in competitive districts court the median voter more effectively. See,
e.g., Chavez, supra note 29, at 338–39.
127 Id. at 341–42 (summarizing two key criticisms of this point: “[B]y definition, competitive
districts leave more voters unrepresented,” and “[c]andidates would likely be less interested in
running for office if they knew that slight changes in political sentiment would remove them
from office.”).
128 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
129 BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 100–02.
130 See, e.g., BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 69 (describing Republican redistricting in Pennsyl-
vania that resulted in a 2002 primary battle between two popular Democrats, John Murtha and
Frank Mascara, a fight that became “at times quite nasty”).
131 Chavez, supra note 29, at 338.
132 Grainger, supra note 68, at 547 (finding a relationship between legislative redistricting and
polarization). But see NOLAN MCCARTY et al., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1 (2006) (finding polarization is not attributable to redistricting but is
instead the result of income inequality).
133 The adoption of a somewhat unusual redistricting process in Iowa, for example, reflects
decades of wrangling between the U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme court, legislators, and citi-
zens. See Peverill Squire, Iowa and the Political Consequences of Playing Redistricting Straight,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 261–63 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005).
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abuses of redistricting authority with great leaps forward, while others experiment in
smaller steps.134 For example, citizens commissions may start as advisory in nature
only, whereby an independent or quasi-independent commission drafts a redistricting
plan subject to approval by the legislature.135 This form of commission exists in various
iterations in several states such as Iowa and New York.136 Other states have experi-
mented with a “backup commission” approach such that stalemated negotiations in the
legislature throw the issue to the commission.137 This system incentivizes bargaining
strategies and other benefits.138 Another option for reform involves “politician commis-
sions” composed of elected officials who do not have to obtain legislative approval for
their work.139 The benefit of this system is that it recognizes the political nature of the
task and encourages bargaining and compromise.140 In the twenty-one states in which
panels draw district lines, only thirteen employ commissions with primary respon-
sibility for drawing the plan, two states utilize advisory commissions, and five utilize
backup commissions.141
Yet none of these systems reaches the level of independence and autonomy the in-
dependent citizens commission does.142 This model solves the two great polemics of
independence and autonomy described above. First, because allowing legislators to
“choose their voters” creates conflict of interest concerns, the greater the separation be-
tween legislators who stand to be elected by these districts and the actual district line
drawing, the lesser the conflict.143 The citizens commission system reaches the ultimate
degree of separation as legislators’ sole involvement in the process is the right to strike
names from a pool of potential commission members.144 Second, when commissions
possess mere advisory or backup authority, their effect is only to encourage legislators
134 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 346–77. Stephanopoulos outlines the history of re-
districting initiatives in several states, with Oklahoma standing out for its rather extreme swing.
“Prior to 1960, the Oklahoma state legislature was one of the most misapportioned in the coun-
try.” Id. at 347. The initiative, to enforce the state’s constitutional reapportionment formula by
commission, passed largely because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, the state
supreme court’s “ultimatum to the state legislature,” and progressive state politicians. Id. at 352.
135 Cain, supra note 17, at 1813.
136 Id. at 1813–14.
137 Id. at 1815.
138 Id. (describing how the existence of a backup commission, which would place the line
drawing into a bipartisan process, may boost the majority party’s ability to keep its members
from insisting on their own individual demands).
139 Id. at 1816.
140 Id.
141 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commissions: Legislative
Plans, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissions-table
.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
142 Cain, supra note 17, at 1818.
143 WINBURN, supra note 22, at 2.
144 Application and Selection Process, WEDRAWTHELINES.CA.GOV, http://wedrawthelines.ca
.gov/selection.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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to conduct the process efficiently as legislators retain the power to adopt or reject
these commissions’ lines.145 In other words, no matter the degree of commission in-
dependence, its role is passive barring failure of the legislature to complete its task.
Commissions vested with full authority, subject only to judicial review, may be viewed
as the most autonomous.
California’s new citizens commission possesses not only separation, but also full
enactment power. The legislature retains no authority to approve either commission
members or the results of its work.146 It is possible that these factors are what scare poli-
ticians and those with entrenched interests in the system. A commission operating in
too neutral a manner may disrupt much of what lobbyists and donors have worked to
build, especially if the outcome is a crop of fresh, independent representatives.
D. Redistricting in California
The history of redistricting in California is as varied as its landscape and popula-
tion. Four of the past five redistrictings, including the most recent, have been subject
to litigation.147 In the 1970s and 1990s, independent judges drew district lines, while in
the 1960s, 1980s, and 2000s, the legislature did.148 The decade-long shadow of each dis-
trict redrawing, coming immediately after and as a consequence of the U.S. Census,
provides case studies from which to draw conclusions. Indeed, the 1973, 1981, and
1991 redistricting experiences illuminate trends in the process as well as the roots of
reform that would culminate in the passage of Proposition 11 and 20.149
In the 1970s, the Democrats controlled the legislature but answered to a Republican
governor, Ronald Reagan.150 This led to a showdown in 1971 as the Governor refused
to enact a district map that gerrymandered benefits for the Democrats.151 As a result, a
panel of special masters, California State Supreme Court appointed judges, drew the
lines which were accepted in 1973 and in place for the 1974 election.152 In the 1980s,
however, the Democrat-controlled legislature, with the support of a Democratic gover-
nor, manipulated the process to add five seats for the Democrats while drawing several
oddly shaped districts.153 With striking parallels to the 2012 election, Republicans,
145 Cain, supra note 17, at 1814.
146 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(1).
147 Chavez, supra note 29, at 320. Chavez addresses the past four redistrictings. For analysis
of the most recent redistricting, see infra Part III.
148 Grainger, supra note 68, at 546. See generally GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ,
ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION (2002).
149 Cain, supra note 17, at 1822–23.
150 Grainger, supra note 68, at 548–49.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 548.
153 Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 320,
331 (1985).
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viewing the plan as extreme partisan gerrymandering, immediately challenged the map
with a three-pronged assault.154 First, they used the referendum system to put on the bal-
lot three propositions to replace each of the three legislative maps (assembly, senate,
and congressional).155 Second, they sought to have the plans take effect immediately,
before the propositions were voted on, for the 1982 election rather than the legislature’s
plans.156 Third, they placed Proposition 14 on the 1982 ballot, a proposal to create a
citizens commission to draw district lines instead of the legislature.157 In the end, the
California Supreme Court rejected the Republicans’ redistricting plans and ordered the
legislature’s plans to be used for the 1982 election.158 Proposition 14 failed at the ballot
box, but the other three referenda were successful, overturning the Democrats’ maps
only after they were used for the 1982 election.159 Thereafter, the two parties hammered
out a deal that provided sufficient benefits to Republicans to ensure passage and avoid
defaulting to the special masters.160
The 1980s redistricting imbroglio left a legacy of bitterness between the parties and
illuminates the impetus for subsequent redistricting attempts.161 Lawsuits and calls for
reform marked the 1980s, culminating in 1991 with another impasse in the political pro-
cess in which special masters once again took over.162 This time, the special masters’
plan secured gains for Democrats, which they were keen to lock in through bipartisan-
ship during the next go-around in 2001.163
This makes sense politically: when a majority party is viewed as abusing its line-
drawing power, the opposition will resort to available tactics to upset that hegemony.
In a state like California, where a minority party has recourse to referenda, initiative,
and the court’s special masters, the party in power will operate strategically to maxi-
mize and lock in gains. In a state without such procedures, a majority party would find
less incentive to work with the minority to draw mutually favorable districts. When the
parties work together, horse trading for districts and engaging in give-and-take electoral
exchanges, critics voice the concern that the cost of bipartisanship is competitive elec-
tions, centrist politicians, and moderate legislatures.164 Partisan districting increases a
party’s registration in districts that lean for that party.165
154 Chavez, supra note 29, at 320.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 321.
158 Id.
159 Cain, supra note 17, at 1822.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. It is interesting to note spikes in exchange of seats between the parties in both 1974
and 1992, both times when district maps were drawn by special masters.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1823.
165 Cain, supra note 153, at 329.
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The 2001 redistricting saw just such a result; lines were drawn in a bipartisan
manner, preserving both parties’ seats, and in the election that followed not one seat
changed party hands.166 In a sort of political “live and let live” compact, it seems the
parties were able to find common ground in the preservation of incumbent seats.167 This
deal would prove ironic as the law of unintended consequences took effect in the subse-
quent years. The 2002 election, in which long-time politicians Howard Berman, Brad
Sherman, Lois Capps, Elton Gallegly, and David Dreier168 all benefitted with safe seat
victories, stood as an “argument against the redistricting system in California” and a
poster child for partisan gerrymandering gone too far.169
III. PROPOSITION 11
As a consequence of these experiences, California reformers continued to view any
redistricting linked to the very political branches being elected with suspicion and dis-
trust.170 This distrust led to efforts by various groups to change the redistricting process.
Proposition 14, which would have created a commission with members selected by
judges and the parties, failed in 1982, as did similarly styled Proposition 39 in 1984.171
In 1990, voters also struck down Proposition 118, which would have required redistrict-
ing plans to receive two-thirds of the vote in the legislature, the governor’s signature,
and voter approval, and Proposition 119, which would have created a bipartisan com-
mission to draw maps.172 Finally, in 2005, Proposition 77, which would have created
a commission to conduct redistricting, also failed to receive voter approval.173
Proposition 11 would be different. This time, proponents would be more focused,
support more widespread, and endorsements more ringing.174 An initiative placed on
the ballot by voters, Proposition 11 would amend the California constitution by es-
tablishing a “Citizens Redistricting Commission . . . [to] draw new district lines . . .
for State Senate, Assembly, and Board of Equalization districts.”175 Then-Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned for the measure stating, “[w]e need a system of
truly competitive legislative districts so when lawmakers go home, they can be held
accountable.”176 The measure even proclaimed under its “Findings and Purpose”
166 Grainger, supra note 68, at 549.
167 Chavez, supra note 29, at 321.
168 See infra Part IV for discussions about these politicians and how the citizens commission
affected their electoral futures.
169 Grainger, supra note 68, at 549.
170 Cain, supra note 17, at 1822.
171 Chavez, supra note 29, at 323.
172 Id. at 324.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 326.
175 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11, § 2(a) 137, available at http://wedrawthelines.ca
.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf.
176 George Skelton, Logjam Sends Coalitions down the Initiate Trail, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/10/local/me-cap10.
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section that “[a]llowing politicians to draw their own districts is a serious conflict of
interest that harms voters.”177 With strong popular support for the bill, well-funded
backing, and the governor campaigning for it, Proposition 11 had better chances than
any prior attempt to change redistricting in California.
In politics, promises are easy and facts are difficult. Supporters of Proposition 11
all but promised that more competitive elections would result from the passage of the
bill. Steve Westly, former State Controller, touted Proposition 11 as a common sense
measure that would create more competitive districts and “bring democracy back to
California again.”178 Westly cited “ideological extrem[ism]” as holding publicly funded
institutions, such as schools and hospitals, hostage during the recent budget fight in
Sacramento.179 A coalition of good-government groups such as California Forward,
California Taxpayers Association, and the League of Women Voters, sponsored the bill
and it was endorsed widely by politicians.180 The measure was even supported by for-
mer Governor Gray Davis whom Schwarzenegger replaced in a 2003 recall election.181
Governor Schwarzenegger sharpened his language as the vote drew near stating, “This
is a fixed system, . . . a system that rewards legislators for rigid partisanship . . . .”182
Proposition 11 differed in substantial ways from prior measures to reform the
district-line-drawing process. First, the proposition gave the task entirely to a citizens
commission, constrained only by the provision that the maps must conform with the
U.S. Constitution and the VRA.183 Second, the measure provided a minimal role for the
legislature.184 Third, there was no role for retired judges as in the prior measures.185
Finally, as initially proposed, Proposition 11 left in the hands of the legislature the task
of drawing congressional lines, giving the citizens commission the authority to draw
state Assembly, Senate, and Board of Equalization lines.186
A striking feature of the Proposition is its reference to three cities with “oddly
shaped districts to protect incumbent legislators.”187 The proposition avers that voters
177 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11, § 2(a) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthe
lines.ca.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf.
178 Schwarzenegger Stumps for Prop. 11, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2008, 8:41 AM),
http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=9783.
179 Id.
180 Cain, supra note 17, at 1823.
181 Nancy Vogel, Prop. 11 Aims to Redo Remap, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at B1, B7.
182 Id. at B7.
183 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11, § 3.3 137, available at http://www.wedrawthe
lines.ca.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf. The proposed law contains other guidelines such
as requiring districts to be drawn “[t]o the extent practicable . . . to encourage geographical
compactness.” Id.
184 For example, the Legislature must “provide adequate funding to defend any action regard-
ing a certified map” but may not amend Chapter 11 of the California Constitution without first
meeting a strict set of conditions. Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. § 3.2(1) (“[T]he Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly,
Congressional, and Board of Equalization congressional districts . . . .” (strikeout in original)).
187 Id. § 2(b).
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in these and other communities have “no political voice because they have been split
into as many as four different districts.”188 Even more striking are the proposition’s
promises, from making the redistricting process “open” and ensuring “full participation
of independent voters” to putting “voters back in charge.”189
A. Passage of Proposition 11
California voters agreed, and in 2008 took the job of district line drawing from the
state legislature and placed it in the hands of a citizens commission by a vote of 50.9%
in favor, 49.1% opposed.190 As initially passed, the proposition did not include U.S.
congressional districts. That provision was passed two years later in Proposition 20,
passed by a vote of 61.3% in favor, 38.7% opposed.191
Proposition 11 added Section 2 to Article XXI of the California Constitution and
declared: “[T]he Citizens Redistricting Commission . . . shall adjust the boundary
lines,” summarily removing the task from the legislature.192 Consisting of fourteen
members, the new commission was to be composed of five members registered with
each of the two largest parties and four not registered with either.193 Creation of such
a commission would immediately raise VRA concerns. Since the early 1970s, several
counties in California have qualified for coverage under Section 5 due to their Latino
populations.194 While the Latino population in the West has grown in recent years,
Latino electoral weight has not grown equivalently.195 Such underrepresentation is not
necessarily the result of gerrymandering and voter suppression as it is for other ethnic
and minority groups with different histories.196 However, statistics show the Latino
population in California grew from thirty-two percent in 2000 to thirty-eight percent
in 2010, but decreased in the California legislature from twenty-two percent in 2000
188 Id.
189 Id. § 2(a), (e).
190 Jean Merl, Panel Expected to OK its Redistricting Plan, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at
AA3; Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote: November 4, 2008,
General Election, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/.
191 Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote: November 2, 2010,
General Election, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete
-sov.pdf.
192 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
193 Id.
194 Preclearance Submission of the 2011 Redistricting Plan for the Counties of Kings,
Merced, Monterey and Yuba by the State of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, n.3,
available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_112011/handouts
_20111116_gdc_sec5sub.pdf. While the only states in the West fully covered by Section 5 of the
VRA are Arizona and Texas, Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba Counties in California are
also covered. See Jason P. Casellas, Redistricting and Latino Representation in the West, in
REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 95, 96–97 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
195 Casellas, supra note 194, at 95.
196 Id. at 95–96.
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to eighteen percent in 2011.197 In fact, the increase in Latino population accounts for
fully ninety percent of California’s overall population growth.198 The new commission
would have to draw new district lines in conformity with the VRA provisions, Supreme
Court decisions, and the principles enunciated in the California Constitution.199
Many districts with significant Latino populations were heavily Democratic in the
prior map, yet held by Anglo- or African-American incumbents.200 The commission’s
new map changed this dynamic in several places. Some incumbent Democrats faced
challenges from Latino Democrats in their primary.201 Add to this California’s new
“jungle primary” in which the top two vote getters in a primary face off in the general
election, regardless of party.202 This scheme offered the chance that a district could see
a Latino and an African-American or Anglo Democrat compete in the runoff election.203
Indeed, this was the result in several districts in 2012,204 yet how Proposition 11 will
impact Latino descriptive representation remains unclear and may not be evident
for years.205
B. Challenges to the Plan
Hardly had Secretary of State Debra Bowen certified the Commission’s work be-
fore challenges were filed with the State Supreme Court, per the statute’s provisions.206
One such challenge, Radanovich v. Bowen, alleged that race was used improperly as a
factor in creating voting districts.207 The plaintiffs alleged California’s 37th, 43rd, and
44th Congressional Districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the VRA, and requested the Court appoint special masters to redraw
the lines.208 On October 26, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition.209
197 Id. at 101.
198 Id.
199 Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11, § 3.3(d) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthe
lines.ca.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf.
200 Casellas, supra note 194, at 102.
201 Id.
202 Alex Isenstadt, California Incumbents Safe No More?, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2011), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/52970.html.
203 See Casellas, supra note 194, at 102.
204 See infra Part IV.
205 See Casellas, supra note 194, at 102.
206 The amendment includes the provision that “[t]he California Supreme Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings in which a certified final map is challenged or is
claimed not to have taken timely effect.” CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 3 (b)(1).
207 Verified Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or Prohibition,
Radanovich v. Bowen, No. S196852 (Cal. Sept. 29, 2011).
208 Id.
209 Radanovich v. Bowen, No. S196852 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (en banc) (denying motion to
strike, petition for writ of mandate, and request for emergency stay), available at http://wedraw
thelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_102011/handouts_20111026_csc.pdf.
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Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in U.S. District Court,210 to which the Citizens Commis-
sion timely filed a motion to dismiss.211 The court dismissed the case on res judicata
grounds finding: (1) the California Supreme Court had reached a final judgment on the
merits; (2) the issues in the prior dispute were the same as in the federal claim; and
(3) the same parties were involved in both actions.212 Therefore, under California law,
the prior rejection of the case was a final judgment.213
In another petition to the California Supreme Court, Julie Vandermost214 filed a
Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or Prohibition Emergency
Stay Requested in September 2011.215 The petition specifically challenged the certified
maps for the California Senate216 and requested that the court prohibit the Secretary of
State from enforcing them.217 Petitioner argued the maps were unconstitutional, unlaw-
ful, and unenforceable.218 Petitioner sought to stay the use of the maps and offered three
alternatives plans, one involving using a “nesting plan” or by reverting to the 2001 odd-
numbered Senate districts.219
Meanwhile, a citizens group began to circulate petitions for a referendum staying
the implementation of the redistricting commission.220 In light of the fact that the peti-
tion had received over 700,000 signatures, Vandermost’s petition requested the Court
to clarify which district map for the State Senate would be used in the election in the
event the challenge successfully qualified for the ballot.221 Vandermost also filed three
possible alternate maps to be used in that event, rather than using the commission’s
certified maps.222
Concurrent with these events, the citizens commission submitted its certified maps
to the U.S. Attorney General for consideration under the VRA in November 2011.223
210 Radanovich v. Bowen, No. 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012), available
at http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/CA%20radanovich%2020120209%20order.pdf.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Julie Vandermost, an Orange County businesswoman, has been a consistent player in the
fight over redistricting. As chairwoman of Fairness and Accountability in Redistricting, she
helped place Proposition 40, a ballot referendum challenging the California Senate map drawn
by the commission. See Jim Sanders, GOP Ends Effort to Kill California Senate Districts, Won’t
Push Prop. 40, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 13, 2012), http://archive.is/LHFCx.
215 Verified Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or Prohibition at 15,
Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446 (Cal. 2012), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov
/downloads/meeting_handouts_122011/handouts_20111213_vandermost_refpetition.pdf.
216 Id. at 1.
217 Id. at 15.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 33.
220 Id. at 22.
221 See id. at 28–37.
222 See id. at 28–33 (suggesting three remedies that may be easily implemented: (1) the simple
nesting plan; (2) the existing 2001 Senate districts; or (3) Quinn’s Model Constitutional Plan).
223 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Kamala D. Harris, Cal. State
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The U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the maps and did not “interpose any objection
to the specified changes” the maps made.224 Upon these grounds, the citizens commis-
sion’s work could go forward without federal challenges to its legitimacy, notwithstand-
ing the pending state court claims.
In January 2012, while the primary election was beginning to warm up, the
California Supreme Court ruled on Vandermost’s inquiry regarding the challenge to
the commission and which maps would be used.225 The court ruled that Vandermost’s
petition for writ of mandate was ripe, but found that there was no showing that the chal-
lenged referendum was likely to qualify for the ballot.226 The court agreed with the
Secretary of State’s argument that even if the commission’s map is eventually stayed
by the challenge, it should nonetheless be used during the primary election for the sake
of continuity and smoothness of elections.227 Specifically, in order to “avoid disruption
of the election planning process,” confusion, and the concomitant ills it would bring,
the commission’s map would be most appropriate.228 The court cited Assembly v.
Deukmejian229 for the proposition that the court must determine which map is “reason-
ably and practically available” and the “pros and cons of each.”230 It then evaluated
four maps available: the commission’s certified map and three maps submitted by
Vandermost.231 It is not surprising that the court concluded that the commission’s map
was the “most appropriate,” citing its conformity with the “constitutionally mandated
criteria embodied in the federal and state Constitutions.”232 The court went on to de-
scribe the process by which the commission had done its work, from the proposition
that put it on the ballot to the selection method used for its members.233
With the commission’s maps firmly in place for the 2012 election, what re-
mained was to observe their impact on the matchups, discourse, fundraising, and ulti-
mately whether they would diminish the partisanship of the legislative bodies they
would produce.
IV. THE 2012 ELECTION
The 2012 election was bound to be a shake-up to some degree. Pundits and ana-
lysts, not to mention political stakeholders, held their collective breath throughout the
Attorney Gen. (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting
_handouts_012012/handouts_20120119_mofo_casupdoj.pdf.
224 Id.
225 Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446, 451 (Cal. 2012).
226 Id. at 446, 451.
227 Id. at 451.
228 Id.
229 639 P.2d 939 (Cal. 1982).
230 Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 451 (citing Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939 (Cal. 1982)).
231 Id. at 474–75.
232 Id. at 451, 466.
233 Id. at 455–58, 484 (emphasizing the transparency and openness of the commis-
sion’s procedures).
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process, witnessing long-time incumbents retire, Democrat pitted against Democrat,
and voters reading ballots with two unfamiliar names under the major parties’ banner.
The 2012 election was variously referred to as a “perfect storm,”234 “slugfest,”235 and
even an “omen” for the Republican party and its future electoral losses.236 Through the
white noise of derision and praise for the commission’s work several key races and
outcomes emerged, which suggest conclusions about the consequences of California’s
electoral experiment.
This study analyzes three California districts comparing the new commission maps
with those that existed prior to Proposition 11. It will analyze the significant electoral
consequences of the commission’s work and assess whether competitiveness or the
other goals were realized. A necessary constraint in this analysis is that the process of
redistricting does not neatly arrange voters from former districts into new ones. For ex-
ample, the 26th district largely became the 27th on the new map.237 Comparing the old
26th to the new 26th would be comparing entirely different constituencies, an analysis
with distinct merits and possibilities, yet not the focus of this study. This study aims to
compare outcomes where former and new districts largely overlap.
A. From Safe to Safe: The 27th District
California’s 26th District once covered from La Canada Flintridge all the way to
Rancho Cucamonga and north to San Gabriel and San Bernardino.238 The work of the
redistricting commission, however, changed the composition of the district, now num-
bered the 27th, adding eighteen percent more Asians and decreasing the white popula-
tion to twenty-nine percent.239 Registered Democrats increased from thirty-five percent
to forty-two percent.240 David Dreier, an influential and long-serving Republican, now
faced a new constituency and the prospects of an uphill battle for reelection.241 Dreier
234 Isenstadt, supra note 202.
235 Bob Morris, California Open Primary Leads to Democratic Slugfest, IVN (July 19, 2012),
http://ivn.us/2012/07/19/california-open-primary-leads-to-democratic-slugfest/.
236 Jens Erik Gould, Is California’s Democratic Supermajority an Omen for the Rest of the
U.S.?, TIME (Nov. 20, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/11/20/is-californias-democratic-super
majority-an-omen-for-the-rest-of-the-u-s/.
237 See California’s Citizen Commission Final District Maps, L.A. TIMES, http://www.la
times.com/la-redistricting-map-july-2011,0,5339409.htmlstory#37.42166,-119.27199999999999
,6,usCongress,,,current (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Interactive Maps]. The user can
select regions throughout the state and compare, side-by-side, the prior map with the current
including geography, party registration, and race and ethnicity.
238 Id.
239 See Demographics of the New Congressional Districts, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2011), http://
spreadsheets.latimes.com/usCongress-2011-0729/?force=True&sortOrder=1&sortColumn=3
[hereinafter Demographics Spreadsheet].
240 Id.
241 Richard Simon, Rep. David Dreier Decides Against Seeking Reelection, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/02/rep-david-dreier
-decides-against-seeking-reelection.html.
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decided not to run, citing Congress’s “low approval rating” and Americans’ desire for
“change in Congress.”242
Dreier’s decision could not have been a difficult calculation. After three decades
in Congress, Dreier had amassed considerable clout and influence, chairing the House
Rules Committee and establishing a solid conservative record.243 But these credentials
would do him no good in the new arrangements. His San Dimas home, in the prior 26th
District, was now placed in the 32nd District with its sixty-two percent Latino and
forty-seven percent registered Democrat to twenty-eight percent Republican.244 Dreier’s
other option was to run in the new 27th, a less unlikely prospect with forty-two percent
Democrat and thirty percent Republican.245 If he did, Dreier would face an uphill battle
necessitating huge influxes of cash to compete in a Democratic district against Judy
Chu, a popular Democrat whose former 32nd District had been incorporated into the
new 27th District.246 If the commission’s goal was to convert safe districts into competi-
tive ones, it utterly failed in the 26th/27th by instead creating a safe Democratic district.
Dreier opted for retirement and Ms. Chu won with an astounding sixty-four percent of
the vote against newcomer Jack Orswell.247
In this District, the promise of a newly competitive race with fresh candidates and
new ideas did not result. While one long-time representative’s choice of retirement
over a bitter fight may be exactly what some proponents envisioned, a well-connected
politician winning with a supermajority clearly was not. It seems instead the work
of the commission created an environment where well-respected and popular repre-
sentatives simply could not win, but the new district that forced his retirement was
still noncompetitive.
B. Berman v. Sherman: The Slugfest
As previously discussed, competitiveness is supposed to force candidates to broad-
en their appeal, move closer to the center politically, and attenuate their positions.248
242 Id.
243 See Catalina Camia, GOP Rep. Dreier of Calif. Announces Retirement, USA TODAY
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/02/david-dreier
-retire-house-rules-committee-/1#.Uk1qFnf8KKI; David T. Dreier’s Voting Records, PROJECT
VOTE SMART, http://votesmart.org/candidate/key-votes/26765/david-dreier (last visited Oct. 21,
2013). But see Brownley in the 26th District, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at A18 [hereinafter
Brownley], available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/endorsements/la-ed-end-brownley
-strickland-20121005,0,6634076.story (explaining that “even though they may not yet appreciate
the fact . . . David Dreier [is a] moderate[ ] . . . who [has] focused on sound policy more often
than ideology”).
244 See Demographics Spreadsheet, supra note 235.
245 Id.
246 See Interactive Maps, supra note 233.
247 Candidate Details: Judy Chu, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com
/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=5474 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
248 See Chavez, supra note 29, at 338–43.
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After the maps were redrawn for the 2012 election, California’s new 30th District in-
corporated territory once divided between Democrat Howard Berman’s 28th District,
Democrat Brad Sherman’s 27th District, and the prior 30th District.249 Both candidates
had won reelection with greater than sixty percent in their largely Democratic respective
districts for more than a decade.250 However, combined with California’s Proposition
14 allowing the top two vote getters to compete in a runoff election regardless of party
affiliation, the new 30th District was headed for a bruising battle between two well-
funded and entrenched Democrats.251
Redistricting favored Brad Sherman. The new 30th District was made up of sixty
percent of the voters from his prior district compared with twenty percent from Howard
Berman’s.252 Politically, the new 30th District was a shoo-in for any Democrat: forty-
nine percent of registered voters were Democrats compared with twenty-five percent
Republican.253 Indeed, the primary election resulted in both Democrats winning,
Berman garnering thirty-two percent of the vote to Sherman’s forty-two percent.254
Voters would have their choice between two Democratic Jewish lawyers with rhyming
last names, both educated at the University of California, Los Angeles, and with largely
the same political views.255 The differences between their positions came down to minor
nuances and the merits of their background experiences rather than deep divides over
policy.256 For example, while both supported it, Berman was seen as a “more enthusi-
astic supporter of free trade.”257 Both supported immigration reform, but Berman had
a longer history of advocating for farm workers.258
Depending on your political views, this scenario either represents the most competi-
tive election imaginable or the most disenfranchising. Two candidates very close in
political opinion may have been what reformers had in mind, but not necessarily two
candidates both on the political left. On the other hand, while Democrats might be glad
249 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Lines Redrawn, Longtime Allies Fight for a Seat, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/us/politics/lines-redrawn-longtime-allies
-fight-for-a-seat.html.
250 Candidate Details: Brad Sherman, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com
/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=746 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); Candidate Details:
Howard L. Berman, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html
?CandidateID=754 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
251 Steinhauer, supra note 245 (quoting Eric Bauman, chairman of the Los Angeles County
Democratic Party, as saying, “This is going to be the battle royal . . . . Both of these guys will be
extremely well funded with top-flight campaign teams.”).
252 Molly Ball, Clone Wars, THE ATLANTIC (May 21, 2012, 2:18 PM) http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/clone-wars/308983/.
253 See Demographic Spreadsheet, supra note 234.
254 Morris, supra note 231.
255 See Ball, supra note 248 (listing similarities between the two candidates).
256 See generally Op-Ed., Howard Berman in the 30th, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at A25.
257 Id.
258 Id.
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to be assured one of these two Democrats would be elected, they would also be assured
that both could not simultaneously be elected to the House of Representatives. One
would have to go home.
The consequence of the independent citizens commission’s work, then, would be
to force two well-respected Democrats with proven track records in their districts to
spend millions of dollars lambasting each other in search of the narrowest political high
ground.259 Herein lies one key shortcoming in the independent citizens commission, es-
pecially the California iteration. Legally mandated majority-minority districts, along
with California demographics, will usually be strongly Democratic because these popu-
lations are usually predominantly Democratic.260 As a result, these districts will usually
be highly noncompetitive. Further, placing so many Democrats into a district may even
necessitate the drawing of safe Republican districts.261 To proponents of progressive
reforms, this poses a moral dilemma: preserve minority voting strength while sacrificing
electoral competitiveness.262 Compactness might also be jeopardized in search of com-
petitive districts by stretching districts between areas dominated by different parties.263
Competitive districts of the sort envisaged by proponents of Proposition 11 may not
only be difficult given these conflicting objectives and legal and demographic con-
straints, they may not even be desirable. Group sorting264 and cultural polarization265
are facts of American existence. Depending on which prestigious publication one con-
sults, partisan politics either causes polarization among Americans or is the result of
it.266 In either case, Americans are becoming more deeply divided politically. Redistrict-
ing may offer very little to ameliorate this trend.
Further, ignoring the reality of a divided America may be problematic in other
ways. As previously discussed, competitive elections tend to draw greater fundraising
259 See Ball, supra note 248 (quoting Representative Henry Waxman as saying, “I’m angry
that two Democrats are running against each other, spending millions of dollars, when we could
have used that money to elect other Democrats.”).
260 Chavez, supra note 29, at 345.
261 Id. (explaining that the dispersing of minorities throughout the state has forced map
drawers to encompass pockets of ethnic communities, thus constraining their options in popu-
lating the surrounding districts).
262 Id. (citing California’s constitutional provision to respect the “geographical integrity of
cities and counties” as another force constraining the creation of competitive districts).
263 Id. at 353.
264 See generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2008) (discussing America’s homogeneity within communities
and political subdivisions, partially the result of our highly mobile population).
265 See generally Steven Strauss, Six Reasons American Political Polarization Will Only Get
Worse, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/blog/six-reasons
-american-political-polarization-will-only-get-worse.
266 For example, Strauss’s study cites “Ideologically Safe Congressional Seats” as a factor
contributing to political polarization making compromise a “dirty word.” Id. Chavez, on the other
hand, turns this around, explaining that “Democrats . . . mov[e] to Democrat-majority counties
and Republicans to Republican counties.” Chavez, supra note 29, at 346.
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by interest groups and raise tensions in the debate.267 On the other hand, safe districts
create little political noise as candidates are almost certain of victory.268 It may be that
with the former, more Americans on the farther political edges will be unrepresented
as more moderate candidates succeed in more evenly divided districts. Finally, with
safe districts, the acrimony and tension that would otherwise play out during the elec-
tion are instead released in the legislature, with the citizens observers to the drama
rather than players in it.
C. The Ribbon of Shame
The California 23rd is another district that experienced dramatic changes as a
direct result of the commission’s work. Known as the “ribbon of shame,” the former
California 23rd District once snaked along the California coast for hundreds of miles
between bucolic Cambria and busy Oxnard.269 Literally no thicker than a few blocks in
some portions, the district has long been the object of scorn for its gerrymandered
shape, but its representative, Lois Capps, has benefited from this linking of distant bas-
tions of Democrats.270 She has easily won reelection in each election since the District
was drawn after the 2000 census.271 However, much has changed since the commission
conducted its work.272 The new District covering most of this territory—the 24th—will
retain a Democratic majority, but by a much narrower margin. This district is composed
of 39.2% registered Democrats and 35.4% registered Republicans.273
In the 2012 election, Ms. Capps faced Republican Abel Maldonado in the 24th
District.274 This District was one of the few Republicans hoped to wrest from Demo-
crats as the demographics tended to infer a chance at a competitive election.275 But Ms.
Capps’s popularity, decades of service, and name recognition gave her the edge.276
267 See Chavez, supra note 29, at 339 (suggesting that greater competitiveness in elections
leads to higher campaign contributions).
268 See Strauss, supra note 261 (discussing the prevalence of ideologically safe congres-
sional seats).
269 McGreevy, supra note 5, at AA4.
270 Candidate Details: Lois Capps, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com
/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=736 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
271 McGreevy, supra note 5, at AA4. The previous district composition was 44.3%
Democratic, 32.9% Republican.
272 See Rep. Lois Capps Will Run for Re-election in New 24th District, CAL COAST NEWS
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://calcoastnews.com/2011/08/rep-lois-capps-will-run-for-re-election-in
-new-24th-district/ (explaining that the new district “promises to be a more challenging race
for Capps”).
273 See Demographics Spreadsheet, supra note 233.
274 Capps Wins in 24th Congressional District, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://latimesblogs
.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/11/24th-congressional-district-lois-capps-abel
-maldonado.html.
275 See Demographics Spreadsheet, supra note 235.
276 Ms. Capps’ husband, Walter Capps, also served in the House of Representatives until his
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What became clear is that longtime representative Elton Gallegly found himself re-
districted not into a district of overwhelming Democrats, but one of Republicans, with
another popular and powerful Republican congressman, Buck McKeon.277 Under the
new configuration, most of the 23rd District territory was incorporated into a new 24th
District, and the new 23rd District moved far inland taking bits from several other dis-
tricts.278 These changes dramatically altered voting populations. The new 24th District
became narrowly Democratic, but assumed a more balanced composition of voters than
previous.279 The iconic Morro Rock and surrounding sleepy bed-and-breakfasts became
part of the same district as larger inland cities like Santa Maria and small rural towns
like Santa Ynez.280 In order to win a closely divided district such as this, a candidate
would presumably have to attenuate her views to gain voters at the margins.
For Elton Gallegly, the decision was probably not too difficult. He decided not to
seek reelection due to the redistricting.281 Gallegly may have foreseen the type of intra-
party fight exemplified by the Berman v. Sherman contest and chose retirement instead.
Perhaps he saw the difficulty of running a race in a more moderate district as a candi-
date with a strongly conservative record. In any event, citizens in the much more nar-
rowly divided district, forty-one percent Democratic and thirty-six percent Republican,
are now represented by a long-time Democrat with as liberal a record as Gallegly’s was
conservative.282 Whether this was the vision of the proponents of Proposition 11 is dif-
ficult to tell. More difficult to tell is what future elections will hold and to what extent
any new competitive districts will simply revert back to safe ones.
CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the Berman v. Sherman conflagration and other exam-
ples demonstrate why competitiveness generally is a fool’s gold of electoral reform.
The fight for the 30th District was arguably one of the ugliest and costliest in recent
California history, nearly coming to blows during a debate.283 Howard Berman’s de-
feat after nearly $15 million spent by the candidates and outside groups ultimately does
not benefit voters of either party.284 The retirement of key representatives like Elton
sudden death in 1997. See Walter Capps, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com
/1997/nov/04/local/me-50174.
277 Brownley, supra note 239.
278 See Interactive Maps, supra note 233.
279 See Demographics Spreadsheet, supra note 235.
280 See Interactive Maps, supra note 233.
281 Brownley, supra note 239.
282 See Demographics Spreadsheet, supra note 235.
283 See Sean Sullivan, Berman-Sherman Debate Turns Nasty, In a House Race that Is Already
Heated, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012
/10/12/berman-sherman-debate-turns-nasty-in-a-house-race-that-is-already-heated/ (“During an
exchange, Sherman put his arm around Berman, and asked: ‘Do you want to get into this[?]’”).
284 Michelle Quinn, Brad Sherman Defeats Howard Berman After Bitter Fight, POLITICO
(Nov. 7, 2012, 6:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83477.html (citing the $15
million figure for expenditures).
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Gallegly also may not improve representation measurably or increase voter satisfaction
in candidate selection. Finally, and most important to this inquiry, the citizens commis-
sion in California did not create the hoped-for competitive elections, and therefore has
little chance at measurably reducing polarization in Sacramento or Congress. Instead,
the changes it wrought simply paved the way for other well-connected politicians to
win safely in those districts and create a new generation of safe districts.
The greatest advantage to the implementation of the citizens commission has likely
been the appearance of transparency and the diminished sense of an inherent conflict
of interest in Sacramento.285 Californians clearly felt the impulse to remove from legis-
lators the power over district line drawing and probably voted in favor of it, cognizant
of the state’s history with partisan gerrymanders. Beyond the senses and impressions
that the system is now more transparent, little seems to have been gained from handing
the task of redistricting to a citizens commission in California. Given the present
evidence, there is simply insufficient evidence to draw causal links from the estab-
lishment of a citizens commission to increased competitiveness and ultimately to
less polarization.286
Finally, for good or for bad, politicians in Sacramento have one less arrow in their
quiver when it comes to political bargaining. This may be one of the bigger losses, as
leaving redistricting in the hands of those most experienced in performing grand bar-
gains has distinct policy benefits of its own.287 While conclusive statements about the
citizens commission are premature after only one election, it is safe to suggest that stud-
ies should continue to assess California elections with a critical eye on the causal link
between the citizens commission’s work and legislative polarization. One such study
should evaluate future elections in light of what may have resulted from a redistricting
process that retained the citizens commission, but returned the redistricting to the
legislature and required the two bodies to work collaboratively.
285 Reducing the “appearance of influence or access” may itself justify the establishment of
citizens commissions notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s finding of fact to the contrary. See
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (finding that the electorate will not “lose faith
in our democracy” merely because of the appearance of improper influence). But see Allison Orr
Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1305–12 (2012) (criti-
cizing the type of “in-house fact finding” demonstrated in Citizens United and proposing two
solutions to the problem: “confin[e] the evaluation of legislative fact to sources presented by the
adversary system[,]” and the opposite extreme, “open[ ] up the adversary system so that infor-
mation flows more freely and openly”).
286 See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (identifying this as a primary rationale for imple-
menting citizens commissions); see also Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause
Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 678 (2009) (recognizing a similar breakdown in causation
despite “a compelling circumstantial case” that partisanship causes an increase in polarization).
287 Chavez, supra note 29, at 372.
